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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

---------------------------------JOHN ELWOOD DENNETT
Plaintiff and Appellant
vs.

Case
No.11256

ALVIN I. SMITH
Defendant and Respondent.
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
Because appellant has included in his
Statement of Facts so many extraneous matters
totally unrelated to the issues of this
case, the respondent chooses to make his
own statement of facts:
STATEMENT OF FACTS
John Elwood Dennett, plaintiff-appel Iant,
commenced an action in the Third Judicial District
Court, in and for the County of Salt Lake, State of
Utah, against Alvin I. Smith by a summons and complaint,
the significant portions of which consisted of the following
al I egations:

3. That during the months of September, October
and November 1967 defendant mode, declared and
11

1
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published to one Phil Phillips, and others,
certain derogator and libellous (sic.) statements
re ating and pertaining to the p aintiff, which
tended to degrade and discredit him, to plaintiff's
special and general damage.
4. That the statements made were without truth,
merit, or substance, and were intentionally made
for the purpose of purveying and promulgating
malicious untruths and gossip, and for no other
purpose which entitled plaintiff to punitive damages.
11

5. That the amount and extent of damage has not
yet been ascertained, but will be supplied by way
of amendment to plaintiff's complaint.
11

"WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays special, general and
punitive damages be awarded in his favor and against
defendant in such amount as the evidence sustains,
together with costs and other appropriate relief."
(Emphasis added.)
Contrary to the recitation (on page 3 of plaintiff's
brief) of things Mr. Smith purportedly told Mr. Phillips,
plaintiff's complaint is devoid of any hint of the nature of
the alleged "derogatory and libellous (sic) statements."
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Thereafter, Smith served on Dennett, who was
acting as his own attorney, a Motion to Dismiss, alleging
(I) that the complaint fails to state a claim against
defendant upon which relief can be granted, and (2) that
the plaintiff has been adjudicated a bankrupt and is not
the proper party to bring such action.
A hearing on defendant's motion to dismiss was
held on March 12, 1968 before the Honorable Leonard W.
Elton, Judge of the Third Judicial District Court. Judge
Elton ruled that the plaintiff's complaint was deficient in
that it failed to state verbatim the alleged defamatory
words; and thereupon, on April 3, 1968 entered an order
dismissing plaintiff's complaint unless the plaintiff amended
his complaint within 20 days. Plaintiff apparently elected
to stand on the legal sufficiency of his complaint, and
after the 20 days al lowed for amendment had elapsed
plaintiff fi Ied a Notice of Appeal.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I. PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT DOES NOT
STATE A CLAIM UPON WHICH RELIEF CAN BE GRATED
AS REQUIRED BY RULE 8{a) AND WAS PROPERLY
DISMISSED.
POINT 11. THE EFFECT ON THIS CASE 0:: PLAINTIFF'S
PENDING BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I. PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT DOES
NOT STATE A CLAIM UPON WHICH RELIEF
CAN BE GRANTED AS REQUIRED BY
RULE 8(a) AND WAS PROPERLY DISMISSED.
Respondent intends in this Point to answer al I of
the issues raised in Points, One, Two, and Three of
appel Iant's brief on appeal.
Historically it has always been necessary in an
action for Iibel or slander to set forth in the complaint
sufficient al Iegations to show that the statement or matter
complained of is defamatory as to the plaintiff. Under
the early English practice the pleading of an action for
defamation was highly technical; and many cases have
been lost for minute variances between the pleading and
the proof. Under the common law form of action for
defamation it was necessary to set forth certain technical
al legations known as the innuendo, the inducement and
the colloquium in order to have a legally sufficient
pleading. With the adoption of code pleading, these
requirements were relaxed somewhat. However, it was,
and is, sti 11 necessary to set out the defamatory words
verbatim in the complaint. The only modification of
this requirement is that many states will permit the libel
or slander complained of to be set out in substance and
effect. The general rule is well stated in 33 Am. Jur.Libel and Slander - Sec. 237, as follows:

4
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---"While some courts have held that the libel or
slander complained of may be set out in substance
and effect, the great weight of authority supports
the view that in the absence of any statutory
provision to the contrary, it must be repr:>duced
verbatim, not only in order to enable the court
to determine whether it is in fact defamatory, but
also to apprize the defendant of the exact charge
that he wi II be cal Ied upon to answer. 11
One leading authority for this statement is Kirby v.
Martindale, 19 S. D. 394, 103 N. W. 648 (1905). In
that case the material part of the complaint with respect
to the defamation stated as follows:
• • • that in the 1903 issue of the said Law Directory
the defendant wrongfully, wilfully, injuriously,
maliciously, and without any justifiable cause
printed and published ••• of, about, concerning,
and touching this plaintiff in his professional
standing, a certain libelous statement and publication,
the substance and effect of which was that this
plaintiff was a second-rate lawyer, of only fair
standing, and worth only some $10 ,000 to $20 ,000
11
••••
(Emphasis added.)
11

The defendant filed a demurrer, which the lower court
sustained; and thereafter, upon the plaintiff's appeal,
the Supreme Court of South Dakota said:

5
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"The rule seems to be well settled, that in a complaint
for libel the libelous publication must be set out in
the complaint, and that it is not sufficient to set out
therein the publication in its 'substance and effect.'
"In Bradstreet vs. Gill, 72 Tex. 115, 9 S. W.753 ..•
the Supreme Court of Texas speaking upon this subject says:
The petition does not set out in haec verba the very
language of the Iibel but pretends to give its substance
and meaning * * * A libel suit is based on language, or
its equivalent. The complaint in a libel suit should put
the court in possession of the libelous matter published-the language used, with such innuendoes as are necessary
to explain what was meant by the language and to whom
it applied--so as to enable the court to determine
whether the words are actionable. In this case the
complaint attempts to give the meaning of the language
only, without stating what the libel was. If the libel
consisted in reporting plaintiff's standing, as mentioned,
in blank, the complaint should have informed the
court ond the defendant of the fact with such explanatiol"li as to what was meant by the report as were necessary to show that the report was injurious and defamatory
It is not sufficient in this kind of a suit to state
the substance of the language used or its meaning. We
believe the general demurrer ought to have been
1
sustained .•••
1

"It is quite clear, therefore, that the complaint as to
the alleged libel, published in 1903, was insufficient,

6
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and the demurrer was properly sustained to that
cause of action or clause of the complaint. 11
On January I, 1950 the State of Utah adopted Rules
of Ci vi I Procedure, modeled after the Federal Rules. Since
that time, the sufficiency of a complaint has been governed
by Rule 8(a}, which states as follows:
11

A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief,
whether an original claim, counterclaim, crossclaim, or third-party claim, shall conatin (1) a
short and plain statement of the claim, showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief; and (2) a demand
for judgment for the relief to which he deems himself
entitled. Relief in the alternative or of several
different types may be demanded. 11
In this brief, appe II ant disputes the present applicability of the above quotation from Am. Jur. and the Kirby
case on the basis that both were published prior to the
adoption of the Rules of Civil Procedure. On JXlge 13 of his
brief, he notes that the first series of Am. Jur. is being
revised, and speculates that the revised volume on libel and
slander, when published, will announce a different rule. It
is significant that appel Iant offers this speculation as a substitute for case authorities. In fact, there are no cases before
or after the adoption of the Rules, which support appellant's
view of the law. However, there are cases, even after the
adoption of the Rules, which reaffirm the necessity of alleging
the defamatory matter verbatim.
·

7
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In the case of Watwood vs. Credit Bureau, Inc.,
68 A. 2d 905 (Mun. Ct. App., D. C. 1959), the plaintiff
filed an action against the Credit Bureau, Inc., alleging
11
that the defendant made false and libelous statements
as to the financial situ1Jtion of the plaintiff, as to her
marital status, and other libelous information which was
11
untruthful and false.
Defendant filed a motion to dismiss
the complaint. The trial court entered its order granting the
motion to dismiss; the plaintiff appealed. In its decision,
the Municipal Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
acknowledged the liberalizing effect of the Rules of Civil
Procedure, but held as follows:
"Dismissal of the complaint was plainly correct.
The weight of authority is that a complaint for
libel should set forth the alleged defamatory matter
verbatim, although some authorities hold that it is
sufficient to state the substance and effect of the
defamatory words. 53 C. J. S., Libel and Slander,
164; 33 Am. Jur., Libel and Slander, 237. Here
neither the Ianguage nor its substance was set forth.
The allegation that defendants made 'libelous statements' is a bare legal conclusion with nothirgin the
complaint to supportthe conclusion. Appellant
argues that her complaint is sufficient under the trial
court's Rule No. 8, based on Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, Rule 8, 28 U. S.C. A., which requires that_
a complaint 'shall contain a short and plain statement
of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
judgment thereon'. Appellant's statement is short
but not plain. It does not show appellant is entitled
to relief. We do not understand that even the
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most liberalized system of pleading permits
a statement of a claim by a legal conclusion.

11

To the same general effect, see, Garcia v. Hilton
Hotels, 97 F. Supp.5 (D.C. Puerto Rico, 1951).
In the case of Heathman v. Hatch, 13 U.2d 266,
372 P .2d 990 (1962) this court had occasion to examine the
sufficiency of a complaint as judged by Rules 8(a} and
9(1). This court said:
11

The objective of these rules is to require that the
essential facts upon which redress is sought be set
forth with simplicity, brevity, clarity and certainty
so that it can be determined whether there exists a
legal basis for the relief claimed; and, if so,so that
there will be a clearly defined foundation upon
which further proceedings by way of responsive
pleadings and/or trial can go forward in an orderly
manner. 11 (Emphasis added.)
Thus, it would appear that the adoption of Rule 8(a} did
not change the former requirement that the defamatory matter
be set out verbatim in the complaint.
Rule 9 of the Utah Rules of Ci vi I Procedure relates
to a miscellaneous assortment of mattersvl.1 ich may or must
be treated specially in pleading. Rule 9 (j) (I) states as
fol lows:

9
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"It is not necessary in an action for libel or slander
to set forth any extrinsic facts showing the application to the plaintiff of the defamatory matter out
of which the action arose; but it is sufficient to
state generally that the sane was pub Iished or
spoken concerning the plaintiff. If such allegation
is controverted, the pcrty alleging such defamatory
matter must establish on the trial, that it was so
published or spoken.
While this Section obviously changes some of the things
which had to be pleaded, it has no application to the
requirement that the defamatory words be set forth verbatim.
Under the common law requirements of pleading, the plaintiff
had to show that he was the person defamed. Where the
publication forming the subject matter of the action did not
contain any direct reference to the plaintiff, the complaint
had to set forth such extrinsic facts as were necessary to
show the application of the defamatory words to the plaintiff.
This was called the colloquium. Thus, for example, in the
case of Shaw Cleaners and Dyers, Inc. vs. Des Moines
Dress Club, 245 N. W. 231 {Iowa), the plaintiff in its
complaint alleged that the defendant had published an
advertisement in a newspaper containing words as follows:
"Garments cleaned at half price are only half
cleaned.
"When you buy cleaning for half price, you get

10
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just what you pay for ••• half way cleaning and
pressing. 11
While these words on their face do not seem to be defamatory
the plaintiff further alleged by way of the colloquium that th~
plaintiff for several weeks prior thereto had been advertising
a cleaning sale using the phrase, "Half price for the second
garment", and that at the said time no other per.son or firm
in the cleaning business in the vicinity of Des Moines was
advertising cleaning at half price. These allegations were
necessary under the former statutes relating to pleadings
in order to show that the defamatory matter applied to the
plaintiff. However, under the provisions of Rule 9 (j} (1)
the plaintiff's complaint could merely have stated the words
published and alleged that the same were published concerning the plaintiff.
Furthermore, it should not be thoughtthat Rule
9 (j) (1) is a Iiberal innovation which started in Utah
with the Rules of Civil Procedure. In fact, Rule 9 (j} (1)
has no corresponding subject in the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, but rather was taken from Section 104-13-9,
Utah Code Annotated, 1943, and was inserted into the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure in order to preserve a liberalizing element first adopted in Utah under code pleading prior
to the adoption of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
The code form of Section 104-13-9, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953, and its preservation in Rule 9 (i) (1)
of the Utah Rules of Civi I Procedure merely affect the
manner in which a plaintiff pleads the common law colloquium; it does not change any other allegation necessary
11
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to be pleaded in a defamation action; and particularly,
it does not remove the necessity for setting forth verbatim
in the complaint the alleged defamatory words.
POINT II. THE EFFECT ON THIS CASE OF
THE PLAINTIFF'S PENDING BANKRUPTCY
PROCEEDING.
On September 14, 1967 appellant filed a voluntary
petition in the United States District Court for the District
of Utah under the provisions of Chapter XI I of the Bankruptcy
Act. Subsequently (but prior to the filing herein) the
United States District Court entered its order adjudicating
appel Iant a bankrupt and directing that the bankruptcy be
proceeded with pursuant to the provisions of Chapters I
through VI I of the Bankrup\·cy Act.
At the hearing of this case before Judge Elton,
respondent conceded that the pendency of the bankruptcy
proceedings would have no effect on the rights of the
plaintiff (rather than his TrU>tee in Bankruptcy) to commence
the action herein as the real party in interest. Respondent
does not intend to argue differently before this court.
However, whether the appel !ant is bankrupt or not has
no effect on 1he sufficiency of plaintiff's complaint.

12
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, respondent respectfully
submits that the action of the District Court was clearly
correct in dismissing plaintiff's complaint, and that the order
of dismissal should be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,

JOHN G. MARSHALL
Tuft and Marshal I
53 fc st Fourth South
Salt Lake City, Utah
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